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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
N.H.B., a minor.
Respondent.
KEARNS-TRIBUNE CORPORATION,
publisher of the SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE,

Case No,

Petitioner/Appellant.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following question is presented for review by
Kearns-Tribune Corporation (hereinafter "Kearns-Tribune"),
expressed in terms and circumstances of the case, but without
unnecessary detail:
Question:

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err on

constitutional grounds when it concluded that there is a
presumption that all juvenile court proceedings are to be
closed to the public and press?

Furthermore, if the Court of

Appeals did err, what standards should a juvenile court apply
to determine if closure is warranted?

Particularly, is closure

constitutionally permissable where the findings and conclusions
of the court are unsupported by evidence.

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals may be found
as No. 880109-CA of the records of the Utah Court of Appeals
and as In re N.H.B., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
OF COURT
This petition is brought before the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (1953)
and 78-2-1(5) (1953) and Rule 42 et seq. of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.

The decision sought to be reviewed was

entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on February 22, 1989.
There has been no order respecting a rehearing or granting an
extension of time.
STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The interpretation of the following constitutional
provisions and statutes is determinative of this matter:
Constitutional Provisions
First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
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of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-33 (1953)
Hearings in children's cases shall be held before
the court without a jury and may be conducted in
an informal manner. The general public shall be
excluded and only such persons admitted,
including persons whom the parents wish to be
present, as have a direct interest in the case or
in the work of the court; provided, however, that
whenever the hearing is had on a written petition
charging what would be a felony if committed by
an adult, persons having a legitimate interest in
the proceeding, including responsible
representatives of public information media, may
be admitted by the judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for Writ of Certiorari for the
review of an opinion and decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
that affirmed the closing of a juvenile court proceeding to the
press and public by the Second District Juvenile Court, Judge
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Sharon P. McCully presiding, in In the Matter of N.H.B., a.
minor.
The proceeding closed was a hearing on a motion to
recall jurisdiction to determine whether or not N.H.B., a
person under the age of 18, was to be treated as an adult or a
minor for alleged acts of N.H.B. that if committed by an adult
would be felonies.

Kearns-Tribune requests this Court to issue

its writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to review
that Order closing the recall proceeding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
[Inasmuch as the hearing held below on January 7,
1988/ is of ultimate importance in resolving the issues
presented to this Court, a copy of the complete transcript of
that hearing is included herein as Appendix "C" to this brief
as a convenience to the Court.

All references to the

transcript (referred to hereinafter as "T.") refer to that
transcript.

Other references to the record are to the

particular pleading or document of record inasmuch as the
record has not been consecutively numbered by the Juvenile
Court Clerk.]
N.H.B. (the initials of the accused and the way that
person was referred to in many of the juvenile proceedings
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(N.H.B. stands for Nicholas H. Byrd)) was accused in Fifth
Circuit Court (now Third Circuit Court) of aggravated
kidnapping and attempted homicide for allegedly stabbing an
F.B.I, agent.

(T. 19; Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion

to Recall Jurisdiction)

N.H.B. was a minor, however.

(T. 22)

Consequently, N.H.B. asked the juvenile court to recall
jurisdiction of him from the Fifth Circuit Court and,
therefore, that he be handled in the juvenile court process.
(T. 2 ) 1
A hearing to determine whether or not the recall
hearing should be closed to the press and public was held on
January 7, 1988, immediately prior to the scheduled recall
hearing.

(T. 1-2) 2 N.H.B. opposed the opening of the recall

hearing.

(T. 9-13)
Kearns-Tribune, through its legal counsel, presented

oral argument in support of its petition to intervene and in
support of its motion to open proceedings.

(T. 3-9, 20-21)

1

The minor was ultimately certified to be treated as an
adult. (Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Recall
Jurisdiction.)
2

The court entertained and granted the petition of
Kearns-Tribune to intervene for the limited purpose of opposing any
efforts to close any proceeding in this matter. (T. 26-27;
Petition for Limited Intervention; Motion to Open Proceedings;
Order) a copy of which is attached as Appendix HD")
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N.H.B. offered oral argument in opposition to the motion to
open proceedings but offered no evidence.

(T. 9-13)

The State

of Utah did not resist the closing of the hearing and offered
no evidence.

(T. 14)

There were no witnesses presented or any evidence
taken or proffered at the hearing.

(T. in its entirety)

In

particular, there was no evidence taken at the hearing upon
which to conclude that:
a)

a fair trial for N.H.B. would likely be

jeopardized by press and public attendance at the recall
proceeding (T. in its entirety); or
b)

alternatives to closure would not adequately

protect any rights of N.H.B. to a fair trial or protect any
other substantial governmental interest (T. in its entirety); or
c)

any substantial governmental interest was at

risk (T. in its entirety); or
d)

there was a compelling governmental interest

necessitating the closure of the recall proceeding or that
complete closure of the recall proceeding was necessary to
protect the sensibilities of any person, including the accused
minor (T. in its entirety); or
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e)

the physical or psychological well-being of

any person would be affected by having an open preliminary
hearing (T. in its entirety); or
f)

having an open recall hearing would in any

way hinder or impede any potential rehabilitation of the
accused.

(T. in its entirety)
After argument, Judge McCully ruled from the bench

that the recall hearing would be closed to the press and
public.3

(T. 21-14)

The courtroom was cleared of all press

and spectators and the recall hearing commenced.

(T. 30)

N.H.B. was ultimately certified through the recall proceeding
to be handled in the adult criminal justice system.
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Recall
Jurisdiction, pp. 6-7.)3
A few days after ruling from the bench, Judge McCully
issued her Memorandum Decision on the Reams-Tribune1s Motion
to Open Proceedings.

(Memorandum Decision on Motion to Open

Proceedings, a copy of which is attached as Appendix M B M .)

No

findings of fact were entered, however, on the record prior to

J

Judge McCully further ruled that the announcement of
her decision based upon the recall hearing would be open to press
and public. (T. 23) She reserved ruling on whether or not the
oral arguments prior to issuing her order on the recall proceeding
would be open to press and public. (T. 25-26) Those oral
arguments were ultimately opened.
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the closure of the recall proceeding nor were findings of fact
ever entered in this matter.

(T. in its entirety; R. in its

entirety; Memorandum Decision on Motion to Open Proceedings;
Order on Motion to Open Proceedings.)
The Utah Court of Appeals heard this matter on appeal
and, as applicable to this petition, held:
1.

"[A] presumption of openness in juvenile
proceedings is not required under the first
amendment of the United States Constitution."
(Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 8.)

2.

M

[U]nder Article I, Section 15 of the Utah

Constitution, the people do not have a
constitutional right of public access to juvenile
court proceedings in Utah."

(Opinion of Court of

Appeals, p. 11.)
3.

The proponent of an open proceeding bears the
burden of proof.

(Opinion of Court of Appeals,

p. 13.)
4.

Notwithstanding that no evidence was presented by
any party, that "[t]he court's findings amply
support the order that the proceedings be closed
to the media.H

(Opinion of Court of Appeals,

pp. 2, 13-14.)
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Based upon those holdings, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Juvenile Court to close the proceedings.
(Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 4.)
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENTS
This petition for writ of certiorari is made to this
court upon the following two grounds:
1.

The questions presented by this matter and

decided by the Court of Appeals are so important and far
reaching that they should be settled by this Court.
2.

The Court of Appeals has decided a question of

constitutional law in a way that is in conflict with the spirit
and meaning of other decisions of this Court made in analogous
and related situations and, consequently, the resolution of
that conflict should be made by this Court.

See Rule 43; Rules

of the Utah Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THIS MATTER,
BEING OF GRAVE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND OF GENERAL
APPLICATION TO ALL JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS, SHOULD BE
RESOLVED BY THIS COURT.
In petitioning this Court for a writ of certiorari to
the Utah Court of Appeals, Kearns-Tribune asks this Court to
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make its determination in a matter encompassing dearlyimportant and deeply fundamental concepts of freedom, the
foundation of which is anchored in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 15 of the
Utah State Constitution.

In particular, we ask that this court

consider the breadth and extent of First Amendment and Utah
State Constitutional privilege afforded to members of the
public and press in the juvenile court process.

The Utah Court

of Appeals, we believe, did not adequately provide the proper
deference to First Amendment rights and privileges in this
matter.

The Kearns-Tribune does not ask here nor did it ask

the juvenile court or the Court of Appeals for an absolute
right of access to juvenile court proceedings but only to a
qualified right, founded upon a presumption of openness.
Inasmuch as the decision rendered in this matter will
impact the procedures of the juvenile court system in all other
juvenile court matters, this Court should be the one to resolve
what that impact should be.

This Court assumes the

responsibility for promulgating the procedural rules under
which all the courts of this State operate.

A decision of this

court in this matter would compliment this Court's rule making
authority and lower court supervisory responsibility.

As such,

also, this Court could assure a consistent growth in the law.
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Additionally, if there is going to be an exception to
established privileges of a fundamental nature, that exception
should be established by the highest court of this state.
There are no decisions of this Court or the United
States Supreme Court which are directly on point.

This Court

and the United States Supreme Court, however, have consistently
ruled that courts are rebuttably presumed open, only to be
closed upon the showing, supported by evidence, of a compelling
need to close.

The burden of showing that need for closure has

consistently been placed upon the party desiring closure.

The

Utah Court of Appeals, in affirming the juvenile court,
reversed that presumption of openness and the burden of proof.
That court, relying on decisions of supreme courts other than
the United States Supreme Court or this Supreme Court,
concluded that the juvenile court proceeding would be presumed
closed and that Mthe people do not have a constitutional right
of public access to juvenile court proceedings in Utah.M
the Matter of N.H.B., No. 880109-CA.)

(In

As noted later in this

petition, the rule applied in some jurisdictions provides for a
presumption of openness while in others, a presumption of
closure.

This divergence of thought among the courts also

suggests that the Utah high court should resolve the issue for
Utah.
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The decisions, however, of this Court and those of the
United States Supreme Court in analogous and related situations
suggest that this matter should be scrutinized carefully by
this Court.

Those cases where fundamental freedoms are

involved, and where no definitive or substantial prior ruling
has been made upon which lesser courts may be guided, are the
prototype cases that should be resolved by this Court.

Just as

the United States Supreme Court has assumed special
significance in the development of First Amendment law and has
not left it to its federal court of appeals, this Court may
appropriately assume the premier position in resolving First
Amendment and state constitutional issues in its own court
system.

For these reasons, we believe that this Court's writ

of certiorari should issue to the Utah Court of Appeals.
POINT II
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THE DECISION
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS INCONSISTENT WITH DECISIONS OF
UTAH SUPREME COURT AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN
ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS.
The courtrooms of this state and country, whether for
civil or criminal matters, are traditionally and routinely left
open for the press and public to view the administration of
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justice at the pre-trial, trial, and post-trial level.4

The

open courtroom has been thought to be a significant and
important tenet of a free society with direct benefit to the
judicial process.5

4

The United States Supreme Court has provided the
historical and traditional background for open proceedings with
extensive review of both American and English history. Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Chief Justice Burger
traces the tradition of openness to the days before the Norman
Conquest. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565. Kearns-Tribune
does not rely on history, however, in asking this court to reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Just as a history of
openness does not make openness constitutionally required, a
history of closure does not make closure constitutionally
required. The history of juvenile proceedings does not reveal a
strong tradition of openness. At worst, however, juvenile courts
have had inconsistent philosophies with regard to openness. Note,
The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81
Mich. L. Rev. 1540 (1983).
5

In Gannett Co. v. DePasguale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court wrote:
There can be no blinking the fact that there is a
strong societal interest in public trials.
Openness in court proceedings may improve the
quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to
come forward with relevant testimony, cause all
trial participants to perform the duties more
conscientiously, and generally give the public an
opportunity to observe the judicial system.
Also referring to an open trial, the Supreme Court in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), wrote
that "secrecy is profoundly inimical to the trial process." Id. at
595 (Brennin, J., concurring).
(Footnote 5 continued next page)
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Open courtrooms are clearly preferred in even those
areas containing the most sensitive of matters.

This Court has

made it clear that court proceedings are presumptively open.
Reams-Tribune Corporation v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984);
KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981) (Creer); KUTV,
Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983) (Easthope).

That same

constitutional presumption for criminal proceedings has been
established by the United States Supreme Court.6
Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Globe Newspaper

(Footnote 5 cont'd)
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated that public
access to judicial proceedings was "of vast importance"
because of "the security which publicity gives for the
proper administration of justice." Cowley v. Pulsifer,
137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884); Publisher Industries, Inc. v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984)
See also, Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary
of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D.C. Utah 1985).
6 In his plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), Chief Justice Burger suggested
extension of the right of access to civil trials when he wrote:
Whether the public has a right to attend trials
of civil cases is a question not raised by this
case, but we note that historically both civil
and criminal trials have been presumptively open.
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Co, v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).

Consequently, the

requirements established for the closing of hearings (including
trials, pretrials and preliminary hearings) has been given
constitutional significance.

This Court established a

procedure to close preliminary hearings in Kearns-Tribune
Corporation v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984), that must be
met in order to satisfy both federal and state constitutional
requirements.7

A similar procedure for preliminary hearings

was subsequently adopted in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court,
478 U.S. 1 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise II"). The presumption has
clearly been that court proceedings should be left open.
In an analogous situation, the United States Supreme
Court and, only recently, this Court have ruled on the standard
for closing a hearing to protect the sensibilities of juvenile
witnesses.

In Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596

(1982), the court found that even desires to protect juvenile
victims of sex offenses did not warrant an automatic closure of
the hearing.

The same result occurred in State v. Crowley, 766

1

The Utah Supreme Court based its decision on both the
United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution, each
which were independently sufficient to support its ruling. Artie
I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution provides: "No law
shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or o
the press."
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P.2d 1069 (Utah 1988), where a conviction was overturned
because the court automatically closed a hearing to protect a
fifteen year old witness.

In both cases, a presumption of

closure was found to be constitutionally defective.
This matter, however, brings before this Court the
question of to what extent First Amendment rights apply in
juvenile courts, new territory in this state.
court is just that, "a court."

The juvenile

Important matters are handled

there that could be of interest and significance to the public
at large.

The context of this case is demonstrative.

Here,

simply because the juvenile was slightly short of majority age,
the public is totally precluded for no supported reason from
examining the process and facts by which a minor was
adjudicated as capable of being treated as an adult for
charging and trial.

There is nothing in the public domain by

which the public can evaluate why this teenager, accused of
severely stabbing an FBI agent and kidnapping, should be tried
as an adult while some other unknown knife-wielding teenager is
not.

The public ought to be able to observe what goes into its

juvenile system and not be compelled to labor under blind faith
that it works.
The Utah Court of Appeals has established a procedure
diametrically opposed to the standards established in the
similar contexts noted above.

In particular, that court has
-16-

concluded that there is no constitutional right or privilege
for public access to juvenile court proceedings in Utah,

As

such, that court further went on to conclude that even though
the hearing may be opened by the juvenile court judge, that in
doing so the party requesting that the hearing be open have the
burden of going forward with evidence and proving reasons that
it remain open.

No standards for opening the proceeding were

suggested, however.

The court provided that the "proponent of

the motion to open the proceeding, Kearns-Tribune, bore the
burden of proof and cannot now complain because it failed to
offer evidence sufficient to persuade the court." Yet,
clearly, the press or public would not have any information to
present by way of testimony where it had no way of knowing even
who the juvenile was.
The Court of Appeals has placed a burden on the press
and public that probably can never be met.

In Kearns-Tribune

Corporation v. Lewis, supra, at 523, this Court addressed that
very issue when Justice Oaks, in this Court's majority opinion,
wrote:
If the media had the burden of proving that an
open hering would not deny the defendant a fair
trial, this would either doom their efforts to
automatic failure (by requiring proof without
access to evidence) or necessitate cumbersome and
controversial prehearing discovery of evidence to
the media, which could well render the issue of
closure moot before it is heard.
-17-

Consequently, the Court of Appeals has established a rule that
this Court has already concluded to represent a method for the
press that is "doomed" for failure.

The only practical

approach (as well as constitutional approach) is to place the
burden upon the proponent of closure,8
Other courts have reached the conclusion that juvenile
proceedings ought to be presumed open.

Associated Press v.

Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1987) (constitutional
presumption of openness exists in juvenile proceedings to be
overcome only on findings of fact supported by evidence);
Taylor v. Indiana, 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) cert, denied, 459
U.S. 1149 (1983) (qualified constitutional right of access
applies to juvenile proceedings); In re Chase, 112 Misc. 2d
436, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (press and public
have access right to fact finding trial in juvenile case
because the "unmistakable force" of United States Supreme Court

8

No evidence was ever presented during the hearing. The
Court of Appeals indicated that the trial court considered "all
relevant factors" in determining to close the hearing, but those
factors were only asserted in argument and were never supported by
evidence (Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 13). There was no
evidence upon which any finding could be made. There may be good
reasons for closure, but presentment of those reasons, supported by
evidence, should be the burden of the proponent of closure.
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decisions is a strong presumption of open courtrooms); In re
Roberts, 13 Media L. Rptr. 1427 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas,
Juvenile Court, July 29, 1986) (Juvenile had failed to show
sufficient compelling circumstances to rebut Constitutional
presumption of openness); cf.. Oreqonian Publishing v. Deiz, 289
Or, 277, 613 P.2d 23 (1980) (juvenile court order barring press
from juvenile proceeding invalid under Oregon constitutional
provision that "[n]o court shall be secret"); Ohio Ex. Rel.
Dispatch Printing Co. v. Petrie, 15 Med. L. Rptr. 2200 (Ohio
Ct. App., Oct. 25, 1988).
Other courts have not recognized a presumption of
openness for juvenile court proceedings.

Florida Publishing v.

Morgan, 253 Ga. 467, 322 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1984) (in juvenile
proceedings, the public and/or press must be given an
opportunity to show that the state or juvenile interests in
closure are not compelling or overriding; any presumption of
closure is rebuttable); Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v.
Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252 (R.I. 1982) (Richmond Newspapers,
supra, does not apply to juvenile proceedings; would allow
access, however, if name of juvenile available from other
sources); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125 (Vt. 1981) (Vermont statute
and restricted reading of United States Supreme Court cases,
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such as Richmond Newspapers, supra, leads court to deny access
right to juvenile proceedings).9
The Kearns-Tribune suggests that if the Utah juvenile
court system (a part of our general overall legal system) is to
have a rule that is an exception to the general rule in Utah
for other courts that this Court, not the Court of Appeals,
should make such an exception.

Consequently, a writ of

certiorari should issue to the Utah Court of Appeals, thereby
requiring this matter to be heard and resolved by this Court.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The closing of court proceedings should never be taken
lightly.

Petitioners respectfully urge this Court to issue its

writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the
decision of that court so that this matter which is so
important to determining constitutional rights and privileges
and the general workings of the juvenile court system in Utah

9

The Court of Appeals cited Florida Publishing v.
Morgan, supra. Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, supra.
and In re J.S.. supra, in support of its conclusion that there was
no constitutional right to an open juvenile proceeding and that the
burden is on the proponent of openness. That court, however, did
not cite or distinguish any of the cases finding a presumption of
openness in juvenile court proceedings even though they were
provided to that court in briefs and supplemental information.

-20-

may be resolved by this Court.

Furthermore, a decision of the

Utah Court of Appeals which is opposite to the spirit and
rulings of this Court in analogous and similar proceedings
should not be left to stand without the review of this Court
upon which the rule could be either confirmed or rejected.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^-J day of March, 1989.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

D. Miles Hblman
Michael Patrick O'Brien
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 521-3200
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
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Before Judges Garff, Davidson, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Kearns-Tribune Corporation appeals the juvenile
court's order excluding the press from attending a juvenile
court hearing on a motion to recall jurisdiction.
Kearns-Tribune asserts that juvenile court proceedings
should be presumptively open to the press and public, and
that the juvenile court erred in closing the hearing
without entering specific findings that closure was
essential to preserve higher values and narrowly tailoring
its closure order to serve those values. We affirm.
N.H.B., a juvenile, was charged in Fifth Circuit Court
with aggravated kidnapping and attempted homicide.

A-l

N.H.B.'s attorney filed a motion to recall jurisdiction to
the juvenile court, and Kearns-Tribune intervened to oppose
closure of the recall hearing. The juvenile court allowed
Kearns-Tribune to intervene and held a hearing on the
petition to open the recall hearing to the public and
media. None of the parties presented witness testimony or
other evidence during the hearing.
Subsequently, the juvenile court denied the motion to
open the recall hearing, but stated that announcement of
the court's decision on the motion to recall would be open
to the press. Several days later, the court issued a
memorandum decision which first referred to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-33 (1987), requiring closure of juvenile court
hearings to the press and public, except where, in the
discretion of the judge, the media is permitted. The
decision stated that juvenile court hearings are presumed
closed and confidential, and juveniles and their families
have a reasonable expectation that the hearings will be
closed. The court noted that, generally, juvenile court
hearings are closed due to their special nature and
concerns regarding a juvenile's privacy and
confidentiality. In this particular case, the court found
no compelling reason why N.H.B. should have any lesser
right to privacy than other parties in similar matters.
The memorandum decision also noted that in recall hearings,
the accused juvenile is presumed to have committed the
offenses. Thus, abundant testimony regarding the issues
and the offenses would be presented and bias or prejudice
might result if those matters were reported prior to
trial. The court found that the hearing should be closed
because the very issue before the court was whether the
minor should remain in the juvenile system and be afforded
the protections of the juvenile court. Thus, the juvenile
should be provided those protections in the recall
hearing. Finally, the court stated that the juvenile and
his family were entitled to a closed hearing because
sensitive psychological and mental information would be
revealed regarding the juvenile. Kearns-Tribune filed this
appeal contesting the court's closure of the recall hearing.
I.

STANDING

Preliminarily, we must determine whether
Kearns-Tribune has standing to challenge the juvenile
court's closure of the recall hearing. Members of the
media have standing to appeal orders purporting to restrain
the media's conduct in cases where the media has been given
actual notice of the order. KUTV, Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d
513, 517 (Utah 1983). Kearns-Tribune received actual
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notice of the closure order which denied it access to the
recall hearing. Under these circumstances/ Kearns-Tribune
has standing to contest the closure order.
II.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

We next address Kearns-Tribune*s assertion that under
the first amendment of the United States Constitution, the
press and the public have a right of access to juvenile
court proceedings. Kearns-Tribune claims that juvenile
court proceedings should be presumptively open and may be
closed only if the court articulates specific findings
which demonstrate that closure is essential to preserve
higher values, that no less restrictive alternatives are
viable, and that the closure order is narrowly tailored to
serve those values.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly
articulated that the press and the public have a right of
access to criminal trials implicit under the freedom of the
press provision of the first amendment. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603
(1982). In Richmond, the Court traced the long historical
tradition of public criminal trials preceding adoption of
the Bill of Rights, and noted the public policy interests
promoted by that tradition. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 570-71.
Open trials ensure fairness, and promote public support for
both the process and its results. X£. at 571-72. Although
members of the public may not attend criminal trials in
large numbers, the media acts as the public's surrogate in
attending such proceedings and reporting to the public,
thus educating the public. Id. at 573. Further, "[p]ublic
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with
benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.
Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an
appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect
for the judicial process." Globe, 457 U.S. at 606
(footnotes omitted). The first amendment was intended to
promulgate free discussion of governmental affairs, and
access to criminal trials helps to "ensure that the
individual citizen can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government."
I£. at 604.
The first amendment right of public access was
extended to preliminary hearings in Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II),
where the Court observed that in determining whether a
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particular proceeding is presumptively open, the Court
examines whether the place and process have historically
been open to the press and public and whether public access
plays a significant role in the functioning of the
process. i£l. at 2740-41.
The right of public and press access is not absolute/
however, and may be denied if it is "[s]hown that the
denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07. For those
proceedings found to be presumptively open, closure cannot
be ordered "unless specific, on the record findings are
made demonstrating that •closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.'" Press-Enterprise II, 106 S.Ct. at 2743
(quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501, 510 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I)).
Although criminal trials and preliminary proceedings
are presumptively open to the public# the United States
Supreme Court has not determined whether juvenile court
proceedings likewise should be presumed open.1 However,
the Court has noted that historically there have been wide
differences between procedural rights available for adults
in the criminal law system and those provided juveniles in
juvenile court proceedings. In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1, 14,
(1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
In Kent, the Court stated that
The Juvenile Court is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction" of
the child. This jurisdiction confers
special rights and immunities. He is, as
specified by the statute, shielded from
publicity. He may be confined, but with
rare exceptions he may not be jailed along
with adults. He may be detained, but only
until he is 21 years of age. • . . The
child is protected against consequences of
1. In Richmond, the Court observed that while the issue of
access to civil cases is not before the Court, civil trials have
historically been open to the public. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581
n.17. On the other hand, in Justice O1Connorfs concurring
opinion in Globe, she states that she interprets "neither
Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any
implications outside the context of criminal trials." Globe,
457 U.S. at 611.
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adult conviction such as loss of civil
rights, the use of adjudication against
him in subsequent proceedings, and
disqualification for public employment.
The net, therefore, is that
petitioner—then a boy of 16—was by
statute entitled to certain procedures and
benefits as a consequence of his statutory
right to the "exclusive" jurisdiction of
the Juvenile Court.
Kent. 383 U.S. at 556-57 (citations omitted) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added). In Gault. the Court held that
juveniles were entitled to certain basic due process rights,
but recognized the historical confidentiality of juvenile
proceedings and the values derived from such confidentiality.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 24-25. The Court noted that "there is no
reason why, consistently with due process, a State cannot
continue if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve
provision for the confidentiality of records of police contacts
and court action relating to juveniles." J&. at 25.
The Court has also stated that juvenile proceedings are
intended to "fpreserv[e] and promot[e] the welfare of the
child* which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally
different from an adult criminal trial." Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (quoting Santoskv v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
766 (1982) (citation omitted)). Further, the Court has
recognized that, unlike the historic presumption of openness in
criminal proceedings, "all 50 states have statutes that provide
in some way for confidentiality" of juvenile proceedings.
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979).
In Daily Mail, the Court concluded that a statute which
prohibited the truthful publication of the names of juvenile
offenders without court permission was unconstitutional as a
prior restraint of speech. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in
Daily Mail, stated:
It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice
system in the United States that virtually
from its inception at the end of the last
century its proceedings have been
conducted outside of the public's full
gaze and the youths brought before our
juvenile courts have been shielded from
publicity. This insistence on
confidentiality is born of a tender
concern for the welfare of the child, to
hide his youthful errors and "'bury them
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in the graveyard of forgotten past.'"
• . . Publication of the names of
juvenile offenders may seriously impair
the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
justice system and handicap the youths'
prospects for adjustment in society.
i£l. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion also noted that public
exposure might cause undue embarrassment to the juvenile's
family and cause the juvenile to lose employment opportunities.
In addition, publicity would nullify the intent of expungement
laws by allowing access to the juvenile's record through
reference to an old newspaper. Publicity may therefore defeat
the beneficent and rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court
system. I&. at 108. Therefore, even though the Court has not
squarely addressed the issue of public access to juvenile court
proceedings, it has evinced an appreciation for the purposes
served by closure.
Several jurisdictions have addressed the constitutionality
of state statutes establishing a presumption of closure in
juvenile court proceedings and have concluded that the statutes
are permissible under the first amendment.2 Florida
Publishing Co, v. Morgan, 253 Ga. 467, 322 S.E.2d 233 (1984);
Edward A, Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg. 443 A.2d 1252
(R.I. 1982); In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458, 438 A.2d 1125 (1981).
In Florida Publishing, the court held that, consistent with the
2. Two jurisdictions have examined statutes which, unlike the
Utah statute, presume juvenile court proceedings open unless
closure is requested. In Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410
N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1987), the court interpreted its state statute
to allow judges discretion to admit certain enumerated parties
to the juvenile proceeding. Ifl. at 579. The court declined to
interpret the statute to mean that the judge roust allow all
enumerated persons access to the hearing and stated that once
closure is requested, the court must hold a hearing and take
evidence on the need for closure. Jfl. The court stated that
the juvenile court must balance the competing interest in the
confidentiality and anonymity of a juvenile court proceeding
against the media's rights under the first amendment. I£. at
578. In addition, the court must consider the juvenile*s right
to a fair trial under the sixth amendment. I&. The court
concluded that closure should not occur unless the court makes
specific supported findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
(footnote continued on p. 10)
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United States Constitution the state may create a rule that
juvenile proceedings are presumed closed to the public unless
the public or press shows that the state's or the juvenile's
interest in a closed proceeding is not overriding or
compelling. Florida Publishing, 322 S.E.2d at 238. The court
stated that, unlike criminal trials, juvenile proceedings have
been closed to the public, therefore, no historically based
constitutional presumption of openness applies to juvenile
proceedings. Jjl. at 237-38.
In Edward A. Sherman, the court concluded that the
principle of an open trial serves to protect an adult defendant
against prosecutorial or judicial abuse, whereas the juvenile's
interests are best served by anonymity and confidentiality.
Edward A. Sherman. 443 A.2d at 1258. Thus, the court
concluded, the Rhode Island shield law, excluding all from
juvenile proceedings except those with a direct interest, is
constitutionally permissible. I&. Finally, in In re J.S., the
court held that a Vermont statute, which permits the attendance
of the parties, their counsel and witnesses, and other persons
as the court finds to have a proper interest in the case only,
does not violate the United States Constitution. In re J.S.,
438 A.2d at 1129. The court found that the compelling interest
served by the confidentiality shield statute overrides the
public right of access to juvenile proceedings. !£.
Utah's statute is similar to the statutes examined in

Florid? Publishing, Edward At Sherman and in re J»S«

under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-33 (1987), the general public is
excluded from juvenile court hearings, "provided, however, that
(footnote 2 continued)
interest. The court then reversed the trial court's closure
order due to unsupported factual findings, I&. at 580-81.
In Taylor vf State# 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) certt denied
459 U.S. 1149, the court affirmed the juvenile court's order
permitting the media to attend a hearing involving a juvenile
charged with committing robbery resulting in bodily injury. The
Indiana statute permitted the juvenile court to determine
whether the public should be excluded from the proceedings and
stated that the court shall consider that the best interests of
the community are generally served by the public's ability to
obtain information about charges that would be a felony if
committed by an adult. The court concluded that under the
express language of the statute, the charged crime fell within
the class of cases for which access and disclosure are deemed
generally to serve the best interest of the public. Taylor. 438
N.E.2d at 280-81.
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whenever the hearing is had on a written petition charging what
would be a felony if committed by an adult, persons having a
legitimate interest in the proceeding, including responsible
representatives of public information media, may be admitted by
the judge.- The statute, therefore, absolutely excludes the
press from most proceedings, but gives the juvenile court judge
considerable discretion in determining whether the media may
attend hearings involving acts which would constitute felonies
in the adult system.3
We agree with Florida Publishing that the presumption of
openness applied in criminal trials under the first amendment
does not extend to juvenile proceedings. The rationale for the
right of access in criminal trials is not coextensive in the
juvenile court setting. Unlike criminal trials, juvenile
proceedings have not been historically open. Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 107. Further, public access does not play as
significant a role in the proper functioning of the juvenile
justice system as it dbes in the adult system. In contrast to
adult criminal procedures, juvenile court proceedings do not
involve criminal convictions, but are regarded as civil
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-44 (1987). Because
juvenile proceedings are not intended to punish, public access
would not serve as a check against unjust conviction and the
undeserved taint of criminality. Indeed, confidentiality of
juvenile proceedings is designed to avoid such taint. We do
acknowledge, however, the potential public good which would
result from public awareness and understanding of the juvenile
court system. As with the adult system, such publicity would
promote public involvement in the governmental processes and
might deter inappropriate actions on the part of some
participants. However, that potential benefit must be weighed
against the asserted state interest in preserving
confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings. Confidentiality
furthers society's interest in rehabilitation of youthful
offenders and their integration as law-abiding adults. Public
access to juvenile proceedings would detrimentally effect those
purposes of the juvenile justice system. We find that the state
has a compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
juvenile court proceedings which outweighs the media's right of
access. Therefore, we hold that a presumption of openness in
juvenile proceedings is not required under the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.
3. Kearns-Tribune has not differentiated the two types of
proceedings in its arguments, and, therefore, contends that all
types of juvenile court proceedings should be presumptively open
to the public.
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III.

UTAH CONSTITUTION

We next consider Reams-Tribune*s contention that juvenile
court proceedings must be presumptively open under article 1/
section 15 of the Utah Constitution which provides, "[n]o law
shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or
of the press.- In KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 521
(Utah 1983), Justice Oaks examined the case law of states with
similar constitutional provisions and concluded that while
there was "no support for the argument that [section 15 was]
intended to create an absolute right that would exalt the
freedom of the press over every other freedom and interest
protected in the Constitution/" Utah's constitutional free
press provision is at least as protective as the first
amendment of the United States Constitution. As a result, the
Utah Supreme Court has found that the Utah Constitution
implicitly provides a public right of access to criminal
trials. State v. Crowlev, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (December
22, 1988); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 521
(Utah 1984). In the context of criminal proceedings, the court
has "upheld an expansive view of the right to a public trial."
Crowlev, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24.
In Crowley, the court reversed a defendant's forcible rape
conviction because of the trial court's closure of the court
during the testimony of a fifteen-year-old complainant. The
court found that the closure order violated defendant's right
to a public trial under article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution in that it was not supported by any evidence or
findings concerning its necessity. Crowley, 98 Utah Adv. Rep.
at '25. The court focused on the importance of public trials in
the criminal justice system to safeguard the accused against a
miscarriage of justice, keep the prosecution and the judge
within their proper bounds, and allow an accused to have family
and friends present when the accused is facing serious criminal
charges. IdU at 24.
In further interpreting the freedom of the press provision
in connection with criminal proceedings, the Utah Supreme Court
has extended the right of access to preliminary hearings,
Lewis, 685 P.2d at 521, and to competency hearings for criminal
defendants. Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock,
743 P.2d 1166, 1178 (Utah 1987). in Lewis, three defendants
were charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual
assault and aggravated exploitation of prostitution. The
defense and the prosecution joined in a motion to close the
preliminary hearing to the public. The trial court ordered the
hearing closed, stating that the nature of the offense and the
balancing of the interests of the victim required the hearing
to be closed. In reversing the trial court's closure order,
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the Utah Supreme Court examined both the purpose of the
applicable state constitutional provisions and the purpose of
preliminary hearings* I&. at 520-21. The court emphasized
that "[t]he freedoms of speech and press are fundamental to the
effective exercise of the ultimate political power of the
people.* jjj. at 521. If people are to be informatively
involved in the operations of the judicial branch, as part of
their ultimate sovereign power, they must have access to
government operations. I£. Further, the court reviewed the
purposes of preliminary hearings under Utah procedure and found
that in Utah, unlike other jurisdictions, preliminary hearings
do not include motions to suppress evidence and, consequently,
"the added risks of prejudice through pretrial disclosure of
evidence targeted in a motion to suppress are not present in
Utah's preliminary hearing." lfl. The court held that because
a defendant's right to a fair trial prevails over the public's
right of access, preliminary hearings in criminal cases may be
closed when access would pose a realistic likelihood of
prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial. I£. at
523-24.
In determining whether a proceeding should be presumptively
open to the public, Justice Zimmerman, in Bullock, stated that
existence of the right of access would depend upon "the nature
and purpose of the proceeding in issue." Bullock, 743 P.2d at
1177. Accordingly, the court described the nature of the
competency hearings at issue, and found no compelling reason
for presumptively closing them. I&. at 1178-79. In both Lewis
and Bullock, the court noted that the proceedings at issue were
closely related to anticipated criminal trials, presumed to be
open the public, and the same arguments for openness applied.
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the interplay of
the juvenile justice system and the freedom of the press
provision. In fact, all cases dealing with article I, section
15 have involved the adult criminal system in some manner. In
order to determine whether article I, section 15 requires
presumptively open juvenile court proceedings, we will examine
the nature and purpose of those proceedings. In contrast to
criminal proceedings, Utah's juvenile court proceedings are
civil in nature and are not intended to punish. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-44 (1987); State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 <Utah 1975).
The juvenile courts exist to aid the physical, mental and moral
welfare of delinquent children and also to protect society
against mischievous and destructive acts of delinquent
children. Donald R. v. Whitmer, 30 Utah 2d 206, 515 P.2d 617,
619 (1973). Further, the stated purposes of Utah's juvenile
court act are to secure for each child the care, guidance and
control that will serve his welfare and the best interests of
the state, to preserve and strengthen family ties, to improve
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the conditions and home environment responsible for his
delinquency and, at the same time, to protect the community and
its citizens against juvenile violence and juvenile
lawbreaking. Utah Code Ann, § 78-3a-l (1987).4 The juveiu h
courts have jurisdiction in a wide variety of types of
proceedings, including, among others, violations of the law by
juveniles, neglected or dependent children, habitual truancy,
child custody or guardian matters, termination of parental
rights, and ungovernable/ runaway children. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-3a-16 and 16.5 (1987).
H k e t h e criminal SyStem, public proceedings have no I
been traditionally used in the juvenile justice system to
safeguard the rights of the juvenile. Moreover, public access
to juvenile court proceedings could severely undermine the
purposes of the juvenile justice system. Presumptively open
juvenile courtrooms would allow anyone walking by the courtroom
to enter and learn intimate details about highly sensitive
juvenile proceedings. ^Publicity of juvenile proceedings could
embarrass family members, weaken family relationships and
hamper efforts to rehabilitate the juvenile. In re J.S., 438
A.2d at 1129. In addition, publicity could adversely affect
the juvenile's chances for adjusting to society, including his
acceptance by the public and his opportunities for employment.
Un

Id.
Although public access is important to iostex informed
public involvement in government and to enhance public
confidence in the judicial branch, we find that, in light ot
the purposes of the juvenile justice system and the probability
that public access would severely undermine that system, a
presumptively open proceeding is not mandated by the Utah
Constitution. Therefore, we hold that under article I, section
15 of the Utah Constitution, the people do not have a
constitutional right of public access to juvenile court
proceedings *« m-*h.5
4, Section 78-3a-l was amended in 1988, but because the section
is substantive rather than procedural, we apply the version of
the statute in effect at the time the cause of action arose.
Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Utah
1986)). Also# the changes made in the statute do not affect our
analysis,
5. Kearns-Tribune also asserts that L
"1, section 11 of
the Utah Constitution, which states M[a]ll courts shall be
open," provides further support for its position that juvenile
court proceedings should be presumptively open
Article T,
section 11 provides, "All courts shall be open, and every
(footnote 5 continued on next page)
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IV,

JUVENILE COURT'S FINDINGS & ORDER

We next consider whether the trial court properly refused
to open N.H.B.'s recall hearing to the media. Although we have
held that a presumption of closure in juvenile court
proceedings is constitutionally permissible, the presumption is
not irrebutable, because of the constitutional considerations
previously discussed. In instances where an open juvenile
proceeding is sought, an expeditious hearing should be held.
••The public and/or press must be given an opportunity to show
that the state's or juveniles' interest in a closed hearing is
not 'overriding* or 'compelling."1 Florida Publishing Co., 322
S.E.2d at 238. Following the hearing, the court should issue
an order with written findings, sufficient to support the order
and provide meaningful appellate review. Id.
In the present case, all interested parties received notice
of the hearing on the motion to open the proceedings and the
hearing occurred shortly thereafter. None of the parties
presented evidence at the hearing, but offered oral argument
and memoranda on the issues involved.
The court denied the motion to open the hearing based on
the following findings: 1) section 78-3a-33 requires closure
of juvenile court hearings, unless the judge determines
otherwise, and there was no compelling reason in this case to
give the juvenile a lesser right of privacy; 2) in recall
hearings a juvenile is presumed to have committed the offenses,
thus abundant testimony regarding the alleged offenses would be
presented which could result in bias or prejudice if reported
prior to a subsequent trial; 3) the very issue before the court
(footnote 5 continued)
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State • • • any civil cause to which he is a
party." The Utah Supreme Court has stated that section 11
"guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that
is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). In addition, the
constitutional guarantee of access to the courthouse was
intended to confer a remedy by due course of law for injuries to
person, property or reputation. !£. We reject Kearns-Tribune's
suggestion that section 11 mandates that all courts should be
physically open. In addition, Kearns-Tribune has not asserted
how the guarantee of access to the courthouse for a remedy to
injury is relevant to arguments relating to freedom of the press.
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was whether the juvenile should receive the protections of the
juvenile court system; and 4) the juvenile and his family were
entitled to a closed proceeding due to the sensitive
psychological information that would be revealed at the
hearing
i'he applicable standard of review is that "the findings of
the juvenile court are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. If . • . there is evidence to support the trial
court's action that satisfies the applicable standard of proof,
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of
fact.- In re R.W., 717 P.2d 258, 259 (Utah 1986) (citations
omitted). Kearns-Tribune asserts error in the juvenile court's
failure to consider evidence in making its decision to close
the hearing. However, as the proponent of the motion to open
the proceeding, Kearns-Tribune bore the burden of proof and
cannot now complain because it failed to offer evidence
sufficient to persuade the court. It is clear from the record,
moreover, that the trial court fully considered all relevant
factors in arriving at its decision to deny the motion. First,
the juvenile court thoroughly considered the nature of the
recall hearing in making its determination. In deciding
whether the juvenile court should request a return of
jurisdiction, the judge must consider the juvenile's age legal
record and the seriousness of the charge. Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-3a-25(9) (1987). As in certification hearings, the
purpose of the recall hearing is not to ascertain whether or
not the child committed the offense but to determine if the
best interest of the child or of the public would be served by
returning jurisdiction to the juvenile court. In re Shreuder,
649 P.2d 19, 25 (1982). The judge must anticipate the
possibility of an ultimate adjudication of guilt and revie
merits of having the proceeding in the adult or juvenile
systems in that light. I£. at 24. Thus, as the court found,
the recall hearing may involve revealing highly sensitive
information about the child's psychological condition and the
comparative impact upon him of the rehabilitative system of the
juvenile justice system as opposed to the adult criminal
justice system.
Second, the court; factored in the possibility that H.H.B.
might be tried in the adult criminal justice system and
therefore information exposed at the motion to recall hearing
could later infringe upon his right to a fair trial. In
addition, the court appropriately considered that the precise
issue before the court was whether the child should be afforded
the protections of the juvenile coin t system. The courv,<*

880109-CA

3

findings amply support the order that the proceedings be closed
to the media.
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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In this particular case, there is no compelling

reason

that this juvenile should have any lesser right to privacy in hearings
before this Court, and his expectation of privacy is as great as
parties appearing before this Court in other matters.
2.

Evidence regarding the ultimate issues of guilt or innocence
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alleged.

presumption, abundant testimony regarding
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the offenses and ultimate

issues will be presented, and significant bias or predjudice may occur
if those matters are reported prior to arraignment or trial.
3.

The very issue before the Court in this hearing is whether

this juvenile should remain within the juvenile justice system and be
afforded

the

protections

of

the

juvenile

court.

Until

it

is

determined that this juvenile should tried as an adult and treated as
an adult in all respects, he is entitled to the full protections of
the juvenile court system, including confidentility of proceedings.
4.

Sensitive matters regarding the psychological and mental

status of this juvenile will presented in evidence at this hearing,
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J

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

The matter set before the Court this

4

morning is a recall hearing, but prior to beginning that

5

procedure, I have received a petition for intervention on

6

behalf of the Salt Lake Tribune, and we need to hear that

7I
8

matter first.
Could I have the attorneys enter appearances,

9

please?

10

MR. HOLMAN:

Your Honor, Miles Holman on behalf

11

of the Salt Lake Tribune, and my associate, Michael Bryant,

12

is with us also.

13

I

14
15

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BUGDEN:

I

MR. RYAN:

Walter Bugden appearing for N.B.

William Ryan, Assistant United States

Attorney, representing the United States Attorney's Office.
17
18
19

I

THE COURT: All right.
MR. ODDONE:

Rick Oddone, with the Salt Lake

I County Attorney's Office.

20

THE COURT: Thank you.

21

Mr. Holman, this is your petition, if you want to

22
23
24
25

address it.
MR. HOLMAN:

Thank you, your Honor.

What is the

best way to do this so it will be recorded.
THE COURT:

You'll be recorded.

You can sit, that's
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REPORTERS

-HTS,
apologize for the

lateness of the written materials that came to you, these
things always come up very quickly when the press is a part
of it, and I got it to you as soon as I could.
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court concluded in a media
case, it's (inaudible) Eleanor Lewis, Judge Eleanor Lewis,
that court proceedings should be open.

That was, as I

indicated a preliminary hearing case in a criminal matter.
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the press and the
public had a First Amendment of the United States Constitution
right to be present in Court proceedings.

That's not an

absolute right, but it is one that needs to be taken account
of in all proceedings.
The Court also concluded that in conjunction with
a First Amendment right, there is also a Utah State Constitutiona
right to be present in court proceedings, and that one was a
preliminary hearing.
In that matter, the Court indicated, though, that it
may be restricted under several circumstances.

They,—first

of all, there must be—the only grounds for restricting is
that the fair trial rights of the accused are inhibited.
Any type of restriction had to be on written findings,
after evidence was taken, that there was a reasonable likelihood
that the fair trial rights were violated, no feasible and
available petition alternative means of maintaining the
integrity of the—and impartiality of that trial were available,
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The cases that have taken a look at this, since
the Press Enterprises Two case, that's the—kind of the
terminology that's used to describe that precedent case,
because there's another one that went up to the Supreme Court
before it, have recognized that there has been a tradition of
closing juvenile proceedings, and that every State in the
Union has procedures whereby, written into their statutes,
whereby those juvenile proceedings may be closed.

But those

cases have also taken a look at—except for one, and in our
brief, we've cited the opposing case, too, wherein the matter
was closed•
Those cases that they have taken a look at, have
indicated that the Juvenile Court is not unlike any other
Court,

It is a court of- law, established by the States, and

that as such, it is a—a court that should remain open
except for circumstances that are—'that require it to be
closed.

Those circumstances require a showing of reasons,

such as what the Utah Supreme Court indicated.
The—even in spite of that tradition of closing
some cases, courts have concluded that Press Enterprises is
an applicable case, and that there is a First Amendment
right for the press to be present.

As I indicated before,

that is not an absolute right, we don't claim an absolute
right; but there's a burden that must be shown by the party
asking that the case be closed.
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1

provides for permissive closing of preliminary hearings. And

2

when that went to the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme

3

Court concluded that that must take second place, or second

4

chair to the First Amendment, which requires certain factors

5

and determinations, findings to be made prior to closing a

6

hearing.

7

In conclusion on this, I believe the authority to

8

closing—to close a hearing requires that the Court must make

^ J findings that a superior governmental interest, which is
10

superior to a First Amendment right to be present in Court

11

proceedings, must make those findings, first, prior to any

12

closure, and without that, the matter should be open.

13
14

I think it's—one thing that I would like to point
I out to the Court on that is that one of the facts—one of the

15

matters that came up in the In Re:

16

concern of whether or not you should close a hearing where

17

there has been extensive publicity already.

*8

there has been extensive publicity in it, and I'm pleased to

19

indicate to the Court that at least the Salt Lake Tribune

2°

has not published the name of the juvenile accused in this

21

matter.

22

benefit of closure is—is extremely diminished, even if there

23

is some thought to be some benefit of closure.

24 J
25

Roberts case, was the

In this matter,

And that when there is extensive publicity, any

Your Honor, on behalf of the Salt Lake Tribune, we
do petition for intervention, limited intervention to—to
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simultaneously served on you and Mr. Oddone late yesterday
afternoon that had no case authority whatsoever, and then
this morning, Mr. Holman gave me a big packet of information
that I haven't had a chance to review.

So, I don't—I'm not

familiar with any of his case law, and I don't know about the
timeliness of his request.
But it seems to me that we start from the general
proposition that Juvenile Court proceedings are indeed closed
and that the press is excluded from those proceedings.

I

recognize that in this particular kind of a case, the Court
has the discretion to permit the press to be in attendance,
and so it is a discretionary matter; but in the same vein,
it is not mandatory that the press be permitted to attend
this hearing.
Of course, the whole point of today's hearing,
your Honor, is to ascertain whether or not this young man
will have the benefit of the Juvenile Court system.

That's

the whole point of today's hearing, and to determine whether
or not he should be cast out of the benefits and the cloaks
and the immunities and privileges that the Juvenile Court
system extends to youths.
In Ken vs. United States, of course, one of the
important principles that they point out is that a youth's
name and photograph are excluded from the media.

The media

doesn't have access to those.
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also be a great deal of testimony that will bear upon the
maturity of this young man, his age, the sophistication
involved of this young man and the sophistication of this
crime.

It seems to me that that information, by its very

nature, is certainly confidential information, should be
privileged information, and shouldn't make its way onto the
front page of the local section of the Salt Lake Tribune,
We already know that Channel 2 has exercised
absolutely no discretion with regard to protecting the name
or the photograph of this young man; and notwithstanding the
fact that Mr. Holman has indicated, and I certainly agree
that the Tribune—I don't know about the Deseret News, but
that tne Tribune at least has, thus far, protected the
anonymity of my client; but it still seems to me, your Honor,
if we're trying to preserve the ends of justice and if we
think again about the normal presumption in favor of closed
proceedings in the Juvenile Court, that this proceeding should
be no different, particularly where we will be talking about
guilt and innocence issues, and also very sensitive issues
about this young man.
Finally, on the pre-trial publicity issue, surely,
I think we can all agree that there has been extensive
pre-trial publicity already, and in the event that this Court
refuses to grant my motion and the matter is bound over for
preliminary hearing or for proceedings in the adult court, it
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seems to me that this is just one more nail in the coffin,
precluding, or at least impairing the ability of this young
man to receive a fair trial.

I think that the press ought to

wait until after we've had the hearing, and you've made your
decision about whether or not he should have the benefits of
the Juvenile Court.
I don't think we should pull the rug out from under
him at the very hearing where that's the issue that we're going
to decide.
And then I guess also, one last point, is that I do
think, with all due respect to the integrity of the witnesses,
all of them, both defense and State witnesses that will be
testifying today, I think that the integrity of the proceedings
will be served and justice will be served, if they don't have
the news media glaring at them while they testify.

I think

that it's much more likely that you're going to receive honest
impression and honest testimony from cill of the witnesses, if
the press isn't here.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Oddone, do you want to respond?
MR. ODDONE: Mr. Holman doesn't glare very successfully
so that's not one of the State's concerns.
Your Honor, there is two elements, I guess that we
need to address. We're aware that there is significant public
interest and anger over what's taken place in our community.
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Our office has received a large number of phone calls from
citizens who are very interested in what's taking—what's going
on.

And so we're aware that there is an interest, and that the

press would have a desire to provide that information to the
reading public.
We're not insensitive to the fact, though, that
defense counsel does have some issues concerning the minor
and the way that the evidence will be developed in terms of
his case, whether he goes to trial in the adult system, where
the matter has been filed, or whether the Court brings it
back into the Juvenile system for adjudication as a delinquent.
So, we don't resist Mr. Bugden's motion to have the press
excluded.
We do not feel that strongly about the matter, and
we would defer the matter to the discretion of the Court.
I think counsel is also planting seeds that a broader
range of evidence is going to be considered, than the State
would agree with.

We're proceeding under a particular statute,

and that's the recall statute.

Counsel has suggested that some

very sensitive social and psychological factors are going to be
considered today, and that that would also be published in the
press and would be counter-productive to the best interests of
his client.
Our position was at the last hearing that we had,
and still is, that the Legislature has set forth the guidelines
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under the recall statute as to what the Court should, consider
and what evidence the State should marshall and defense should
present in order to make their cases; and that's the age of
the minor, the severity of the offense, and the legal history
of the minor.
And we would ask the Court, and we'll argue that
more thoroughly, I suspect, in a few minutes, to stay

within

the statute and give us a strict interpretation of the law.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Ryan, do you have any concern about
the matter?
MR. BUGDEN:

Your Honor, with all due respect,

before we hear from Mr. Ryan, and with all due respect to
Mr. Ryan, I don't think that the United States Government
has any standing to be here.

I think that they should be

excluded from the hearing.
Of course, you weren't present in the Federal
Court proceedings, your Honor, but the United States
Government has now taken the position that they have—
they've washed their hands of this matter, and they have
abdicated their prosecutorial authority to the State of
Utah, and those are the representations that they have made
repeatedly on the record before Judge Greene.
Mr. Ryan indicated at the last hearing before
Judge Greene, where the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
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was—or the petition for that writ was presented to Judge

2

Greene, that the United States Government intended to dismiss

3

the matter, they've repeated moved the Court to dismiss the

4

matter.

5

proceedings, and notwithstanding they are contrary to Brent

6

Ward's representation that Judge Greene changed his position,

7

Judge Greene has never changed his position, and he has always

8

been concerned about the possibility of an injustice being

9

perpetrated upon my client by the United States Government

Judge Greene has been concerned throughout all of the

10

lying in wait, allowing the State to proceed where the State

11

perhaps has a different burden because of the recall hearing

12

versus the criteria that's set forth in 18 U.S.C. 5032T

13

Because of that, the United States—that's the only reason

14

that the United States Government has ever wanted to dismiss

15

the charge against my client.

16

And Judge Greene's

concern has always been that

17

the United States Government should not be permitted to

18

dismiss without prejudice, wait and see what happens, for

19

example before your Honor, and if I prevail at that recall

20

hearing, or if there is an acquittal on one of the charges,

21

or any disposition favorable to the defendant, or to the

22

juvenile, Judge Greene was always concerned with the manifest

23

injustice of permitting the government, the United States

24

Government to then refile a prosecution and avoid what would

25

otherwise be double jeopardy bar because of the dual sovereignty
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problem.
That has always been Judge Greene's position, and in
response to Judge Greene*s concern in that area, Mr. Ryan, on
behalf of the government, indicated that they intended to
defer the prosecution to the State, that they felt that the
State could surely represent and vindicate the United States
Government's interest•
The United States Government is no longer a p^rty
to this lawsuit, they have nothing to do with the State of
Utah, or in the interest of this particular juvenile, and they
shouldn't be here.

They just simply shouldn't be here, He

doesn't have any standing.

The government has agreed and

consented to the State pursuing the prosecution, and the
order that I imagine that you've had an opportunity to see
that's—well, I can furnish you wish a copy right now, Judge,
so at least you can see what the Judge has signed.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. BUGDEN:

But you'll note, among other things,

your Honor, Judge Greene specifically refused again to permit
the United States Government to dismiss the prosecution without
prejudice, and the Unit—and the Judge, in, Paragraph 7 of the
order, your Honor, states that the order of the court
extending the speedy trial date of December 28 is vacated,
and the Court will entertain a motion to dismiss pursuant to
the speed trial act, on or after January 21, 1988.

In the
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State—in the Federal Court, a juvenile must be brought to
trial, if that juvenile is in detention, within 30 days, • and
so that's the significance of that statutory cite.
It's very clear that Judge Greene intends to bar
the Federal Government from prosecuting this young man, and
that is going to happen, whether the Federal Government likes
it or not, that is what's going to happen on January 21st,
And the United States Government simply has no standing, and
there's, I think something ominous, not about Mr, Ryan, but
the metaphor, at least of the United States Government, again,
hovering at this proceeding, is pernicious, they have no
standing, and they ought to be excluded,
THE COURT:
MR. RYAN:

Okay.
Your Honor, may I address that—

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. RYAN:

—diatribe.

MR. ODDONE:
MR. RYAN:

Only if you promise not to hover.

Mr. Bugden is correct in saying that the

United States has a great interest in this prosecution.

The

Federal matter is still pending; however, the United States
has deferred to the State.
I represented to Judge Greene that since the
United States did not have jurisdiction over the kidnapping
aspect of the case, that it made more sense to have this
case tried before a Court that had all issues before it. The
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United States intended to prosecute the defendant as an adult
for the assault on an F.B.I, agent, and that's the Federal
jurisdiction; but we have decided to defer to the State and
therefore, are very, very interested in seeing that this
individual is prosecuted as an adult.

But as far as my

making any arguments, I don't intend to do anything of that
kind.

I'm here to take notes and to assist Mr. Oddone, but I

don't intend to represent the United States at any kind of
argument, or to—to examine or cross-examine any witnesses.
I'm basically here as a spectator at this point.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BUGDEN:

As a spectator, ne nas no right—

MR. ODDONE:

Well, let me just respond to that, if I

may, just briefly.

In addition to what he has said, to indicate

that the U.S. Government doesn't have an interest in what's
taking place, is to ignore the facts that have been published
about this case, the facts that have been discussed, the facts
that everybody is well acquainted with, and that is the
kidnapping, and specifically, the stabbing of an F.B.I, agent.
The government has a very singificant interest in how the case
proceeds.
In addition to that, I've associated Mr. Ryan with me
during the last several days.

He is the person most knowledgeab.'

about the element of the seriousness of the offense, he is the
liaison with the F.B.I, and has worked closely with me.

We
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donft anticipate he will be representing any party, but I have
associated him with me to assist in marshalling the evidence,
and it is our position that it would be wrong to have him
forced out of the Court, and it would hamper the Statefs
presentation of the evidence.
THE COURT:

You all keep raising new issues for us to

decide•
Mr. Holman, if you have any follow-up here?
MR. HOLMAN:

Getting back to where it was.

I think

the argument in opposition to keeping the hearings open missed
the point on two things.
First of all, the tradition of closing must be,
must take a second position to the First Amendment rights.
Yes, Juvenile Court proceedings have been traditionally closed,
but the First Amendment rights, as that has been involved,
if we had talked about this ten years ago or even five years
ago, we wouldn't have had any cases to bring before the Court.
It is evolving now, and those cases indicate that there is a
First Amendment right to be there; not an absolute right, but
one that is—that should be taken into account prior to any
closure, and that any closure must be supported by findings
of fact, as I've indicated before.
Second to that part was whether we agree with it or
not, and I suspect reasonable minds differ on this, but at
least the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the
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press serves a vital function in our judicial process.
important function*

It's an

Now, we may have people here who think

otherwise, but the United States Supreme Court has done—has
indicated that, and it has supported their decision on
openness of Court proceedings by that, that is the ground
foundation for it, that the press does provide a valuable
service by keeping the workings of government and the judicial
parts of government very essential to our society, open and
available for the people to see.
Your Honor, I submit it.
THE COURT:
It has been

Thank you.
this Court and particularly this Judge's

position for some time, that we cooperated as much as possible
with the press in reporting cases that are before the Juvenile
Court.
I think the public does have an interest in the
juvenile—in Juvenile Court matters, and I have, and will
continue to endeavor to allow the press to be present and to be
informed of matters before this Court whenever possible.
The statute under which we are proceeding certainly
makes a presumption that Juvenile Court matters will be closed
to the public and to the press, so we start from that
presumption.

We also have the statute which allows, within

the discretion of the Juvenile Court Judge, the press to be
present, if the Judge so indicates.
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I understand that this particular matter is of great
interest to the press and to the public? however, I have a real
concern that, both under the law and certainly in the press,
this particular juvenile isn't treated differently than other
juveniles, and I have—I have a pretty serious concern about
that.
I know that the press is here because of the—the
particular victim that is involved in this case, and certainly
all of the publicity that has preceded the hearing today; but
this particular juvenile has no fewer rights to privacy and
confidentiality because he happen s to have chosen a notorious
victim than—than any other juvenile, as long as he is treated
as a juvenile.
So, I—I feel that it's important for him to have
those same rights.

I also think that because of the very

nature of this proceeding, which is different than any
proceeding that would ever take place in any adult court,
that—that the same rules simply don't apply.

This isn't like

a preliminary hearing in a criminal case? in fact, I think we
almost, as we do in a certification case, start out with almost
a presumption, well, an assumption that the crime was committed
and the juvenile committed the crime.

And so we're going to

be talking about ultimate issues here that will ultimately
have to be decided, either in this Court or by a jury or an
adult court, regarding guilt or innocence, and I think
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUHDtNG
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8<M01

C-22

<p p

Mr. Bugden's point on that is well taken.
I also, without ruling on exactly the nature of the
evidence that we're going to accept, because I think we're going
to have to wait and see what is proposed, before I can rule
to limit, r do anticipate that very personal things about
this particular juvenile defendant will be discussed in this
hearing, and as long as he's a juvenile, I believe he deserves
to be treated as a juvenile, and have the same rights of
confidentiality as any other juvenile*
So, I am going to rule that for the evidentiary
portion of this hearing, the press will not be allowed.
I—I do have a feeling that the press has every
right to hear the Court's decision and the reasons for the
decision in this matter.
rule from the bench.

I am not sure that we're going to

I had originally anticipated that we

would have a ruling immediately after the hearing this
morning; however, given the very interesting legal matters
that are continually being raised here, I'm not absolutely
sure we're going to be able to rule from the bench, although
that certainly is a possibility.

And I believe that for any

enunciation of the Court's decision, the press certainly
would be entitled to be present.
I also am not sure that there couldn't be some other
compromises, but I—as I try to think of what they could be,
I can't come up with them.

I was originally thinking that we
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ought to allow them for argument, but not—
MR. HOLMAN:

We have suggested that, and I think both

of us agree that that might not be objectionable, if the
Court decides that that's what it wishes to do.
THE COURT:

I think that would give—that would give

the press a good flavor of what kind of a hearing we're having
and what went on.
Mr. Bugden, how do you feel about that?
MR. BUGDEN:

I think I probably don't object to that,

but depending on the evidence that's received, it becomes a
difficult problem, because I guess I want to think about it.
Mr. Oddone and I did discuss that briefly yesterday, but I
hadn't thought about it carefully.
And my concern is this:

Mr. Oddone kiddingly said

to me this morning when we were talking about the press being
in attendance, he said, well, we decided—and again, this was
just in jest, but we've decided we're only going to—or that
the press has reported to us that they're only going to report
the State's side of this hearing, so we no longer object, and
of course, I —
MR. ODDONE:

I'm a little concerned that we didn't

get a big enough laugh out of that—
MR. BUGDEN:

Well, the anxiety level at that point

was high enough that I wet my pants, and then considered what
he had said; but now, as I think about the closing argument
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problem, on the one hand, what I was going to say to you is,

2

well, depending on the evidence that's received, there needs

3

to be some sort of censure, there needs to be some sort of

4

understanding that they won't report certain evidence. But

5

then the problem that that creates, is that it does become a

6

one-sided—

7

MR. ODDONE:

That's right.

8

MR. BUGDEN:

—news report, because the evidence that

9

J I probably don't want the news media to put on the first page

10

of the local section is the very confidential information that

11

may well be persuasive to your Honor.

12

So, I guess I need to think about it. I don't khow

13

J how we balance that, because I do think that what would end

14

up happening is that it would be a totally one-sided report

15

in the Tribune or the news or whoever it was.

16

know how to accommodate them.

17
18
19

So, I don't

I'd like—you know, my initial reaction was, that's
okay, b u t —
MR. ODDONE: Maybe we should reserve judgment until

20

the Court makes a determination as to what evidence will be

21

considered.

22

MR. BUGDEN:

23 I

THE COURT:

There you go.
I considered the same concern that

24

Mr. Bugden has now expressed, and that is that I certainly

25

don't want to limit him in making his closing argument to things
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

P-2S

25

that he wouldn't want printed in the press.

That would certainl

not facilitate his argument.
I'm willing to reserve judgment on that matter, but
I'll leave open the possibility that we would allow the press
in for closing argument, and certainly, the press will be
allowed at the decision, at the time that the decision is
announced.
And I anticipate, honestly, we're going to have t o —
I'm going to have to make the decision today and announce it
at some point or other, whether I have some time to do some
research on these legal issues or not; at some point today,
we're going to have to make this decision because we're under a
time constraint as far as continuing the prosecution.
So, I guess that's where we're at at this point,
Mr. Holman?
MR. HOLMAN:

Your Honor, if I may just clarify a

couple of things to preserve, if there is any appeal rights,
and I don't know that we've chosen to do so at this time, but
to preserve a few things.
There—I assume from the Court's order that what
you're doing is ordering that the petition is granted to
intervene, to make this motion, anyway, and then this motion
is denied.

Is that—

THE COURT: That's correct.

I—I should have made

it clear from the beginning, that I certainly thought that you
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had the right to have your hearing.
MR. HOLMAN:

Okay.

Thank you, your Honor.

And I

understand the Court may choose to go on, but I think I need
to ask this, to preserve whatever appeal rights there are,
ask the Court to stay the proceeding, pending the potential
appeal of the matter.
THE COURT: Well, I knew you were going to ask that.
MR. BUGDEN:

Well, that—that's all right, let's

just stay, and send all the witnesses Jiome and not worry
about the ten-day requirement.
THE COURT:

I knew you were going to ask that, and I

considered the fact that certainly any appeal you might have
from the Court's ruling would not help you out much if we
continued the proceeding; however, we're under a constraint
that the Court has to make this decision within ten days of
the filing of the Information, which has already passed, but
I'm proceeding under the assumption that we are within ten
days of the release from the Federal injunction in this matter,
And there simply would be no more time to have this hearing
within that time constraint, if I stay it, so we're going to
have to proceed.
MR. ODDONE:

Your Honor, just for the record, in its

remarks concerning the press' interests in the case, the Court
indicated that this juvenile found himself in a difficult
position because of the high profile victim that he had
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84lQl

C-27

2 7

selected.
I hope that's not indicative of the Court's attitude
toward the case; our position is that he finds himself in this
position because of the extremely serious offense that he's
committed, and would be in this position regardless of who
the victim was.
THE COURT: My only—my only intent with regard to
mentioning the victim is that—I'll editorialize just a bit
here for the press, and that is that there are extremely
serious matters that are held every single day in Juvenile
Court.

In the last year, I've handled three or four homicide

cases, numerous attempted homicide cases, numerous aggravated
sexual offenses, and the press is never very interested in what
goes on out here, which is fine.
If you want to—if you want to be here, that's fine,
too; but all I meant by mentioning the fact that it certainly
is the victim in this case, I think, that makes this particular
case more interesting to the press, because it certainly
isn't unique.

And I think it's important that you know that

this is not particularly unique, in terms of its severity in
Juvenile Court, and that's why I don't think this juvenile
should be treated differently than other juveniles who are
accorded privacy and confidentiality rights in juvenile
proceedings.
MR. ODDONE:

And there are two victims, your Honor—

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

C-28

2 8

THE COURT:
MR. ODDONE:
THE COURT:

I know.
—that we're concerned about.
Both of whom are fairly notorious.

But that—that was my only intent in making that
comment,
I do intend to proceed with the motion to recall.
We'll take a five-minute break.

The press is welcome t o —

if you want to hover outside, or Ms.—Ms. Gilson will be
kept aware of the Court's proceedings, and when we intend to
announce or decision, if—I am willing to accommodate the
press to the extent that we give you time to get here, if you
don't want to hover.
Mr. Yocom, did you want to say something?
MR. YOCOM:
County Attorney.

You^" Honor, yes, David Yocom.

Salt Lake

I—my presence here is two-fold, one is to

observe the proceedings, of course, and second was to anticipate
Mr. Bugden's motion to exclude Mr. Ryan from these proceedings,
and I'm prepared to deputize Mr. Ryan as a Deputy County
Attorney, special deputy, so his presence will be here on an
official basis.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I am going to allow Mr. Ryan to

remain present in the proceedings.

I do not think the United

States has any interest in participating in the proceedings
and would not allow any participation,.
I—I am not insensitive at all to Mr. Bugden's
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concerns that he is expressing, but that's not something I can
rule on, and I think that I will allow Mr. Ryan to be here to
assist the State, if necessary, but certainly not as a
participant.
MR. ODDONE:

Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We'll take a five-minutes
recess.
(Recess.)
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I, Brenda Crockett, Deputy Clerk of the Utah State Juvenile Court,
Second District, Salt Lake County, hereby certify that STATE OF UTAH in the
interest of N^G.B., a person under eighteen years of age, heard on January 7,
1988, was electronically recorded by the Utah State Juvenile Court, Second
District, Salt Lake County, and that the tape upon which the hearing was
recorded was delivered to the Associated Professional Reporters for the
purpose of transcription.

Brenda Crockett

I, Viki E. Hatton, of the Associated Professional Reporters, do hereby
certify that I received the above-fnentioned tape and that I caused it to be
transcribed into typewriting and that a true and correct transcription of
the hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages
numbered from 2 to 30, inclusive, and that said pages constitute an
accurate and conplete transcription of all the testimony adduced at the
hearing and contained on the tape except where it is indicated that the
testimony was inaudible,
WITNESS m HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of February, 1988.

6/Jj^ &• A/a&t»o
Viki E. Hatton

My commission expires:
June 9, 1990
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COURT CLCTK

D. Miles Holman (USB #1524)
Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB #4894)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Petitioner
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
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Juvenile Cow
Second 0/sti3g

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT ur DALT LAKE COUNTY
OF THE STATE OF UTA^i

In the Matter of:
ORDER
NICOLAS G. BYRD,
a minor.
Case No. TS^fc^- 2 ?
Judge Sharon P. McCully

KEARNS-TRIBUNE CORPORATION,
PUBLISHER OF THE SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE,
Petitioner.

PETITION
The Petitioner Kearns-Tribune Corporation, publisher
of The Salt Lake Tribune, having brought on for hearing its
Petition for Limited Intervention and its Motion to Open
Proceedings before the above entitled court, Judge Sharon P.
McCully, Juvenile Court Judge, presiding, on Thursday,
January 7, 1988, at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. with the
following appearances being made:

APPENDIX D

1.

D. Miles Holman and Michael P. O'Brien on behalf

of petitioner;
2.

Walter P. Buyden, Jr., on behalf of Nicolas G.

3.

Frederic M. Oddone on behalf of Salt Lake County,

Byrd; and

and after hearing oral argument and being fully apprised in the
circumstances
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The petition of Kearns-Tribune Corporation to

intervene for the limited purpose of approving any motion

to

close any proceedings in this matter to press and public should
be and is hereby granted.
2.

The motion of Kearns-Tribune Corporation to open

the proceedings to press and public and in particular to open a
recall proceeding to be held before the court on Thursday,
January 7, 1988, should be and is hereby denied and the press
will be excluded from the hearing.
DATED this

/3

day of January, 1988.
BY THE COURT

Honorable Sharon P. McCully
Juvenile Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the

I'

day of

January, 1988, I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, to the following parties
of record:
Frederic M. Oddone, Esq.
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
3522 South 700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
F. Walter Bugden, Jr., Esq.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South
Salt Lake. City, Utah 841
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